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ABSTRACT
We present Chameleon, a novel hybrid (mixed-protocol) framework
for secure function evaluation (SFE) which enables two parties to
jointly compute a function without disclosing their private inputs.
Chameleon combines the best aspects of generic SFE protocols with
the ones that are based upon additive secret sharing. In particular,
the framework performs linear operations in the ring Z2l using
additively secret shared values and nonlinear operations using
Yao’s Garbled Circuits or the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson protocol.
Chameleon departs from the common assumption of additive or
linear secret sharing models where three or more parties need to
communicate in the online phase: the framework allows two parties
with private inputs to communicate in the online phase under the
assumption of a third node generating correlated randomness in an
offline phase. Almost all of the heavy cryptographic operations are
precomputed in an offline phase which substantially reduces the
communication overhead. Chameleon is both scalable and signifi-
cantly more efficient than the ABY framework (NDSS’15) it is based
on. Our framework supports signed fixed-point numbers. In partic-
ular, Chameleon’s vector dot product of signed fixed-point numbers
improves the efficiency of mining and classification of encrypted
data for algorithms based upon heavy matrix multiplications. Our
evaluation of Chameleon on a 5 layer convolutional deep neural
network shows 133x and 4.2x faster executions than Microsoft
CryptoNets (ICML’16) and MiniONN (CCS’17), respectively.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy-preserving protocols;
KEYWORDS
Secure Function Evaluation; Privacy-Preserving Computation; Gar-
bled Circuits; Secret Sharing; Deep Neural Networks; Machine
Learning
1 INTRODUCTION
Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) is one of the great achievements
of modern cryptography. It allows two or more parties to evaluate
a function on their inputs without disclosing their inputs to each
other; that is, all inputs are kept private by the respective owners.
In fact, SFE emulates a trusted third party which collects inputs
from different parties and returns the result of the target function
to all (or a specific set of) parties. There are many applications
in privacy-preserving biometric authentication [17, 40, 41, 76, 82],
secure auctions [42], privacy-preserving machine learning [38],
and data mining [63, 64, 74]. In 1986, Yao introduced a generic
protocol for SFE, called Yao’s Garbled Circuit (GC) protocol [89].
The Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW) protocol [45] is another
SFE protocol that was introduced in 1987.
In theory, any function that can be represented as a Boolean
circuit can securely be evaluated using GC or GMW protocols.
However, GC and GMW can often be too slow and hence of limited
practical value because they need several symmetric key operations
for each gate in the circuit. During the past three decades, the great
effort of the secure computation community has decreased the
overhead of SFE protocols by several orders of magnitude. The
innovations and optimizations span the full range from protocol-
level to algorithm-level to engineering-level. As a result, several
frameworks have been designedwith the goal of efficiently realizing
one (or multiple) SFE protocols. They vary by the online/offline run-
time, the number of computing nodes (two-party or multi-party),
online/offline communication, the set of supported instructions,
and the programming language that describes the functionality.
These frameworks accept the description of the function as either
(i) their own customized languages [69, 72], (ii) high-level languages
such as C/C++ [49] or Java [51, 65], or (iii) Hardware Description
Languages (HDLs) [35, 87].
A number of SFE compilers have been designed for trans-
lating a program written in a high level language to low-level
code [46, 69, 72][22–24]. The low-level code is supported by other
SFE frameworks that serve as a backbone for executing the crypto-
graphic protocols. In addition to generic SFE protocols, additive/lin-
ear secret sharing enables secure computation of linear operations
such as multiplication, addition, and subtraction. In general, each
framework introduces a set of trade-offs. The frameworks based on
secret-sharing require three (or more) computing nodes which op-
erate on distributed shares of variables in parallel and need multiple
rounds of communication between nodes to compute an operation
on shares of two secret values.
One of the most efficient secure computation frameworks is
Sharemind [18] which is based on additive secret sharing over the
specific ring Z232 . All operations are performed by three comput-
ing nodes. Sharemind is secure against honest-but-curious (semi-
honest) nodes which are assumed to follow the protocol but they
cannot infer any information about the input and intermediate re-
sults as long as the majority of nodes are not corrupted.We consider
the same adversary model in this paper. Securely computing each
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
03
23
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 J
an
 20
18
operation in Sharemind needs multiple communication rounds be-
tween all three nodes which makes the framework relatively slow
in the Internet setting. Computation based on additive shares in
the ring Z2l enables very efficient and fast linear operations such
as Multiplication (MULT), Addition (ADD), and Subtraction (SUB).
However, operations such as Comparison (CMP) and Equality test
(EQ) are not as efficient and non-linear operations cannot easily be
realized in the ring Z2l .
We introduce Chameleon, a fast, modular, and hybrid (mixed-
protocol) secure two-party computation framework that utilizes
GC, GMW, and additive secret sharing protocols and achieves un-
precedented performance both in terms of run-time and commu-
nication between parties. The analogy comes from the fact that
similar to a chameleon that changes its color to match the color of
the environment, our framework allows changing the executing
SFE protocol based on the run-time operation. The main design
goal behind Chameleon is to create a framework that combines the
advantages of the previous secure computation methodologies. The
idea of a mixed-protocol solution was first introduced in [20] which
combines GC with Homomorphic Encryption (HE). HE enables to
perform MULT and ADD operations on encrypted values without
actually knowing the unencrypted data.
The TASTY framework [46] enables automatic generation of
protocols based on GC and HE. However, due to the high com-
putational cost of HE and costly conversion between HE and GC,
they achieve only marginal improvement compared to the single
protocol execution model [54].
Our framework Chameleon is based on ABY [37] which imple-
ments a hybrid of additive SS, GMW, and GC for efficient realization
of SFE. However, we overcome three major limitations, thereby
improving efficiency, scalability, and practicality: First, ABY’s scal-
ability is limited since it only supports combinational circuit de-
scriptions, but most functionalities cannot be efficiently expressed
in a combinational-only format [87]. Therefore, we add the ability
to handle sequential circuits. In contrast to combinational circuit
representation, sequential circuits are a cyclic graph of gates and
allow for a more compact representation of the functionality. Sec-
ond, the ABY model relies on oblivious transfers for precomputing
arithmetic triples which we replace by more efficient protocols
using a Semi-honest Third Party (STP). The STP can be a separate
computing node or it can be implemented based on a smartcard [36]
or Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [7]. Therefore, the online
phase of Chameleon only involves two parties that have private
inputs. Third, we extend ABY to handle signed fixed-point num-
bers which is needed in many deep learning applications, but not
provided by ABY and other state-of-the-art secure computation
frameworks such as TASTY.
Chameleon supports 16, 32, and 64 bit signed fixed-point num-
bers. The number of bits assigned to the fraction and integral part
can also be tuned according to the application. The input programs
to Chameleon can be described in the high-level language C++. The
framework itself is also written in C++which delivers fast execution.
Chameleon provides a rich library of many non-linear functions
such as exp, tanh, sigmoid, etc. In addition, the user can simply add
any function description as a Boolean circuit or a C/C++ program
to our framework and use them seamlessly.
Machine Learning on Private Data Using Chameleon.
Chameleon’s efficiency helps us to address a major problem in
contemporary secure machine learning on private data. Matrix
multiplication (or equivalently, vector dot product) is one of the
most frequent and essential building blocks for many machine
learning algorithms and applications. Therefore, in addition to scal-
ability and efficiency described earlier, we design an efficient secure
vector dot product protocol based on the Du-Atallah multiplication
protocol [39] that has very fast execution and low communication
between the two parties. We address secure Deep Learning (DL)
which is a sophisticated task with increasing attraction. We also
provide privacy-preserving classification based on Support Vector
Machines (SVMs).
The fact that many pioneering technology companies have
started to provide Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS1,2,3)
proves the importance of DL. Deep and Convolutional Neural Net-
works (DNNs/CNNs) have attracted many machine learning practi-
tioners due to their capabilities and high classification accuracy. In
MLaaS, clients provide their inputs to the cloud servers and receive
the corresponding results. However, the privacy of clients’ data is
an important driving factor. To that end, Microsoft Research has
announced CryptoNets [38]. CryptoNets is an HE-based methodol-
ogy that allows secure evaluation (inference) of encrypted queries
over already trained neural networks on the cloud servers. Queries
from the clients can be classified securely by the trained neural net-
work model on the cloud server without inferring any information
about the query and the result. In §5.1, we show how Chameleon
improves over CryptoNets and other previous works. In addition,
we evaluate Chameleon for privacy-preserving classification based
on Support Vector Machines (SVMs) in §5.2.
Our Contributions. In brief, we summarize our main contribu-
tions as follows:
• We introduce Chameleon, a novel mixed SFE framework
based on ABY [37] which brings benefits upon efficiency,
scalability, and practicality by integrating sequential GCs,
fixed-point arithmetic, as well as STP-based protocols for
precomputing OTs and generating arithmetic and Boolean
multiplication triples, and an optimized STP-based vector
dot product protocol for vector/matrix multiplications.
• We provide detailed performance evaluation results of
Chameleon compared to the state-of-the-art frameworks.
Compared to ABY, Chameleon requires up to 321× and 256×
less communication for generating arithmetic and Boolean
multiplication triples, respectively.
• We give a proof-of-concept implementation and experimen-
tal results on deep and convolutional neural networks. Com-
paring to the state-of-the-art Microsoft CryptoNets [38], we
achieve a 133x performance improvement. Comparing to the
recent work of [66], we achieve a 4.2x performance improve-
ment using a comparable configuration.
1Amazon AWS AI (https://aws.amazon.com/amazon-ai/)
2Google Cloud Machine Learning Engine (https://cloud.google.com/ml-engine/)
3Microsoft Azure Machine Learning Services (https://azure.microsoft.com/
services/machine-learning-services/)
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2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide a concise overview of the basic protocols
and concepts that are used in the paper. Intermediate values are
kept as shares of a secret. In each protocol, secrets are represented
differently. We denote a share of value x , in secret type T , and held
by party i as ⟨x⟩Ti .
2.1 Oblivious Transfer Protocol
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a building block for secure computation
protocols. The OT protocol allows a receiving partyR to obliviously
select and receive a message from a set of messages that belong
to a sending party S, i.e., without letting S know what was the
selected message. In 1-out-of-2 OT, S has two l-bit messages x0,x1
and R has a bit b indicating the index of the desired message. After
performing the protocol, R obtains xb without learning anything
about x1−b and S learns no information about b. We denote n
parallel 1-out-of-2 OTs on l-bit messages as OTnl .
The OT protocol requires costly public-key cryptography that
significantly degrades the performance of secure computation. A
number of methods have been proposed to perform a large number
of OTs using only a few public-key encryptions together with less
costly symmetric key cryptography in a constant number of com-
munication rounds [6, 13, 52]. Although the OT extension methods
significantly reduce the cost compared to that of the original OT,
the cost is still prohibitively large for complex secure computation
that relies heavily on OT. However, with the presence of a semi-
trusted third party, the parties can perform OT protocols with very
low cryptographic computation cost as explained in §4.5.
2.2 Garbled Circuit Protocol
One of the most efficient solutions for generic secure two-party
computation is Yao’s Garbled Circuit (GC) protocol [89] that re-
quires only a constant number of communication rounds. In the GC
protocol, two parties, Alice and Bob, wish to compute a function
f (a,b) where a is Alice’s private input and b is Bob’s. The function
f (., .) has to be represented as a Boolean circuit consisting of two-
input gates, e.g., AND, XOR. For each wirew in the circuit, Alice
generates and assigns two random k-bit strings, called labels, X 0w
and X 1w representing 0 and 1 Boolean values where k is a security
parameter, usually set to k = 128 [14]. Next, she encrypts the out-
put labels of a gate using the two corresponding input labels as
the encryption keys and creates a four-entry table called garbled
table for each gate. The garbled table’s rows are shuffled according
to the point-and-permute technique [73] where the four rows are
permuted by using the Least Significant Bit (LSB) of the input labels
as the permutation bits. Alice sends the garbled tables of all the
gates in the circuit to Bob along with the labels corresponding to
her input a. Bob also obliviously receives the labels for his inputs
from Alice through OT. He then decrypts the garbled tables one by
one to obtain the output labels of the circuit’s output wires. Alice
on the other hand has the mapping of the output labels to 0 and
1 Boolean values. They can learn the output of the function by
sharing this information.
2.3 GMW Protocol
The Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW) protocol is an interactive
secure multi-party computation protocol [44, 45]. In the two-party
GMW protocol, Alice and Bob compute f (a,b) using the secret-
shared values, where a is Alice’s private input andb is Bob’s. Similar
to the GC protocol, the function f (., .) has to be represented as a
Boolean circuit. In GMW, the Boolean value of a wire in the circuit is
shared between the parties. Alice has ⟨v⟩B0 and Bob has ⟨v⟩B1 and the
actual Boolean value is v = ⟨v⟩B0 ⊕ ⟨v⟩B1 . Since the XOR operation
is associative, the XOR gates in the circuit can be evaluated locally
and without any communication between the parties. The secure
evaluation of AND gates requires interaction and communication
between the parties. The communication for the AND gates in the
same level of the circuit can be done in parallel. Suppose an AND
gate x ∧ y = z (where ∧ is the AND operation) where Alice has
shares ⟨x⟩B0 and ⟨y⟩B0 , Bob has shares ⟨x⟩B1 and ⟨y⟩B1 , and they wish
to obtain shares ⟨z⟩B0 and ⟨z⟩B1 respectively.
As shown in [37], the most efficient method for evaluating AND
gates in the GMW protocol is based on Beaver’s multiplication
triples [11]: Multiplication triples are random shared-secrets a, b,
and c such that ⟨c⟩B0 ⊕ ⟨c⟩B1 = (⟨a⟩B0 ⊕ ⟨a⟩B1 ) ∧ (⟨b⟩B0 ⊕ ⟨b⟩B1 ). The
triples can be generated offline using OTs (cf. [84]) or by a semi-
trusted third party (cf. §4.4). During the online phase, Alice and
Bob use the triples to mask and exchange their inputs of the AND
gate: ⟨d⟩Bi = ⟨x⟩Bi ⊕ ⟨a⟩Bi and ⟨e⟩Bi = ⟨y⟩Bi ⊕ ⟨b⟩Bi . After that, both
can reconstruct d = ⟨d⟩B0 ⊕ ⟨d⟩B1 and e = ⟨e⟩B0 ⊕ ⟨e⟩B1 . This way,
the output shares can be computed as ⟨z⟩B0 = (d ∧ e) ⊕ (⟨b⟩B0 ∧d) ⊕
(⟨a⟩B0 ∧ e) ⊕ ⟨c⟩B0 and ⟨z⟩B1 = (⟨b⟩B1 ∧ d) ⊕ (⟨a⟩B1 ∧ e) ⊕ ⟨c⟩B1 .
2.4 Additive Secret Sharing
In this protocol, a value is shared between two parties such that
the addition of two secrets yields the true value. All operations are
performed in the ring Z2l (integers modulo 2l ) where each number
is represented as an l-bit integer. A ring is a set of numbers which
is closed under addition and multiplication.
In order to additively share a secret x , a random number within
the ring is selected, r ∈R Z2l , and two shares are created as ⟨x⟩A0 = r
and ⟨x⟩A1 = x −r mod 2l . A party that wants to share a secret sends
one of the shares to the other party. To reconstruct a secret, one
needs to only add two shares x = ⟨x⟩A0 + ⟨x⟩A1 mod 2l .
Addition, subtraction, and multiplication by a public constant
value η (z = x ◦ η) can be done locally by the two parties without
any communication: party i computes the share of the result as
⟨z⟩Ai = ⟨x⟩Ai ◦ηmod 2l , where ◦ denotes any of the aforementioned
three operations. Adding/subtracting two secrets (z = x +− y) also
does not require any communication and can be realized as ⟨z⟩Ai =
⟨x⟩Ai +− ⟨y⟩Ai mod 2l . Multiplying two secrets, however, requires
one round of communication. Furthermore, the two parties need to
have shares of precomputed Multiplication Triples (MT). MTs refer
to a set of three shared numbers such that c = a × b. In the offline
phase, party i receives ⟨a⟩Ai , ⟨b⟩Ai , and ⟨c⟩Ai (cf. §4.4). By having
shares of an MT, multiplication is performed as follows:
(1) Party i computes ⟨e⟩Ai = ⟨x⟩Ai − ⟨a⟩Ai and
⟨f ⟩Ai = ⟨y⟩Ai − ⟨b⟩Ai .
(2) Both parties communicate to reconstruct e and f .
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(3) Party i computes its share of the multiplication as
⟨z⟩Ai = f × ⟨a⟩Ai + e × ⟨b⟩Ai + ⟨c⟩Ai + i × e × f
For more complex operations, the function can be described as
an Arithmetic circuit consisting of only addition and multiplication
gates where in each step a single gate is processed accordingly.
3 THE CHAMELEON FRAMEWORK
Chameleon comprises of an offline phase and an online phase. The
online phase is a two-party execution model that is run between
two parties who wish to perform secure computation on their
data. In the offline phase, a Semi-honest Third Party (STP) creates
correlated randomness together with random seeds and provides it
to the two parties as suggested in [50]. We describe how the STP
can be implemented in §3.3 and its role in §4.2.
The online phase itself consists of three execution environments:
GC, GMW, and Additive Secret Sharing (A-SS). We described the
functionality of the GC and GMW protocols in §2 and we detail
our implementations of these protocols in §4.1. We implement two
different protocols for the multiplication operation on additive
shares: a protocol based on Multiplication Triples (MT) that we
described in §2.4 and an optimized version of the Du-Atallah (DA)
protocol [39] (cf. §4.2). In §3.1, we explain how the online phase
works. In order to support highly efficient secure computations, all
operations that do not depend on the run-time variables are shifted
to the offline phase. The only cryptographic operations in the online
phase are the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) operations
that are used in GC for which dedicated hardware acceleration is
available in many processors via the AES-NI instruction set.
The offline phase includes performing four different tasks: (i)
precomputing all required OTs that are used in GC and type conver-
sion protocols, thereby providing a very fast encryption-free online
phase for OT, (ii) precomputing Arithmetic Multiplication Triples
(A-MT) used in the multiplication of additive secret shares, (iii) pre-
computing Boolean Multiplication Triples (B-MT) used in the GMW
protocol, and lastly, (iv) precomputing vector dot product shares
(VDPS) used in the Du-Atallah protocol [39]. In order to reduce
the communication in the offline phase from the STP to the two
parties, we use the seed expansion technique [36] for generating
A-MTs and B-MTs (cf. §4.4). We also introduce a novel technique
that reduces the communication for generating VDPSs (cf. §4.2).
3.1 Chameleon Online Execution Flow
In this section, we provide a high-level description of the execution
flow of the online phase. As discussed earlier, linear operations such
as ADD, SUB, and MULT are executed in A-SS. The dot product of
two vectors of size n is also executed in A-SS which comprises n
MULTs and n − 1 ADDs. Non-linear operations such as CMP, EQ,
MUX and bitwise XOR, AND, OR operations are executed in the
GMW or GC protocol depending on which one is more efficient.
Recall that in order to execute a function using the GMW or GC
protocol, the function has to be described as a Boolean circuit.
However, the most efficient Boolean circuit description of a given
function is different for the GMW and the GC protocol: In the GC
protocol, the computation and communication costs only depend
on the total number of AND gates (NAND) in the circuit. Regardless
of the number of XOR gates, functionality, and depth of the circuit,
GC executes in a constant number of rounds. Communication is a
linear function of the number of AND gates (2× k ×NAND). Due to
the Half-Gate optimization (cf. §4.1), computation is bounded by
constructing the garbled tables (four fixed-key AES encryptions)
and evaluating them (two fixed-key AES encryptions). The GMW
protocol, on the other hand, has a different computation and com-
munication model. It needs only bit-level AND and XOR operations
for the computation but one round of communication is needed per
layer of AND gates. Therefore, the most efficient representation
of a function in the GMW protocol is the one that has minimum
circuit depth, more precisely, the minimum number of sequentially
dependent layers of AND gates. As a result, when the network
latency is high or the depth of the circuit is high, we use GC to
execute non-linear functions, otherwise, GMWwill be utilized. The
computation and communication costs for atomic operations are
given in §6.
The program execution in Chameleon is described as different
layers of operations where each layer is most efficiently realized in
one of the execution environments. The execution starts from the
first layer and the corresponding execution environment. Once all
operations in the first layer are finished, Chameleon switches the
underlying protocol and continues the process in the second execu-
tion environment. Changing the execution environment requires
that the type of the shared secrets should be changed in order to
enable the second protocol to continue the process. One necessary
condition is that the cost of the share type translation must not be
very high to avoid diminishing the efficiency achieved by the hybrid
execution. For converting between the different sharing types, we
use the methods from the ABY framework [37] which are based on
highly efficient OT extensions.
Communication Rounds. The number of rounds that both
parties need to communicate in Chameleon depends on the number
of switches between execution environments and the depth of the
circuits used in the GMW protocol. We want to emphasize that the
number of communication rounds does not depend on the size of
input data. Therefore, the network latency added to the execution
time is quickly amortized over a high volume of input data.
3.2 Security Model
Chameleon is secure against honest-but-curious (HbC), a.k.a. semi-
honest, adversaries. This is the standard security model in the
literature and considers adversaries that follow the protocol but
attempt to extract more information based on the data they re-
ceive and process. Honest-but-curious is the security model for
the great majority of prior art, e.g., Sharemind [18], ABY [37], and
TinyGarble [87].
The Semi-honest Third Party (STP) can be either implemented
using a physical entity, in a distributed manner using MPC among
multiple non-colluding parties, using trusted hardware (hardware
security modules or smartcards [36]), or using trusted execution
environments such as Intel SGX [7]. In case the STP is implemented
as a separate physical computation node, our framework is secure
against semi-honest adversaries with an honest majority. The lat-
ter is identical to the security model considered in the Sharemind
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framework [18]. In §7, we list further works based on similar as-
sumptions. Please note that we introduce a new and more practical
computational model that is superior to Sharemind since only two
primary parties are involved in the online execution. This results
in a significantly faster run-time while better matching real-world
requirements.
3.3 Semi-honest Third Party (STP)
In Chameleon, the STP is only involved in the offline phase in
order to generate correlated randomness [50]. It is not involved
in the online phase and thus does not receive any information
about the two parties’ inputs nor the program being executed. The
only exception is computing VDPS for the Du-Atallah protocol in
which the STP needs to know the size of the vectors in each dot
product beforehand. Since the security model in Chameleon is HbC
with honest majority, some information can be revealed if the STP
colludes with either party.
In order to prevent the STP from observing communication be-
tween the two parties, authenticated encryption is added to the
communication channel. Likewise it is advised to encrypt com-
munication between the STP and the two parties so they cannot
reconstruct the opposite party’s private inputs from observed and
received messages.
4 CHAMELEON DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the different
components of Chameleon. Chameleon is written in C++ and ac-
cepts the program written in C++. The implementation of the GC
and GMW engines is covered in §4.1 and the A-SS engine is de-
scribed in §4.2. §4.3 illustrates how Chameleon supports signed
fixed-point representation. The majority of cryptographic opera-
tions is shifted from the online phase to the offline phase. Thus,
in §4.4, we describe the process of generating Arithmetic/Boolean
Multiplication Triples (A-MT/B-MT). §4.5 provides our STP-based
implementation for fast Oblivious Transfer and finally the security
justification of Chameleon is given in §4.6.
4.1 GC and GMW Engines
Chameleon’s implementation of the GC protocol is based on the
methodology presented in [87]. Therefore, the input to the GC en-
gine is the topologically sorted list of Boolean gates in the circuit as
an .scd file. We synthesized GC-optimized circuits and created the
.scd files for many primitive functions. A user can simply use these
circuits by calling regular functions in the C++ language. We include
most recent optimizations for GC: Free XOR [55], fixed-key AES
garbling [14], Half Gates [90], and sequential circuit garbling [87].
Our implementation of the GMW protocol is based on the ABY
framework [37]. Therefore, the function description format of GMW
is an .aby file. All the circuits are depth-optimized as described
in [35] to incur the least latency during the protocol execution.
Chameleon users can simply use these circuits by calling a function
with proper inputs.
4.2 A-SS Engine
In Chameleon, linear operations, i.e., ADD, SUB, MULT, are per-
formed using additive secret sharing in the ring Z2l . We discussed
in §2.4 how to perform a single MULT using a multiplication triple.
However, there are other methods to perform a MULT: (i) The
protocol of [16] has very low communication in the online phase.
However, in contrast to our computation model, it requires STP
interaction with the other two parties in the online phase. (ii) The
Du-Atallah protocol [39] is another method to perform multiplica-
tion on additive shared values which we describe next.
The Du-Atallah Multiplication Protocol [39]. In this proto-
col, two parties P0 (holding x ) and P1 (holding y) together with a
third party P2 can perform multiplication z = x × y. At the end of
this protocol, z is additively shared between all three parties. The
protocol works as follows:
(1) P2 randomly generates a0,a1 ∈R Z2l and sends a0 to P0 and
a1 to P1.
(2) P0 computes (x + a0) and sends it to P1. Similarly, P1 com-
putes (y + a1) and sends it to P0.
(3) P0, P1, and P2 can compute their share as ⟨z⟩A0 = −a0×(y+
a1), ⟨z⟩A1 = y × (x + a0), and ⟨z⟩A2 = a0 × a1, respectively.
It can be observed that the results are true additive shares of z:
⟨z⟩A0 + ⟨z⟩A1 + ⟨z⟩A2 = z. Please note that this protocol computes
shares of a multiplication of two numbers held by two parties in
cleartext. In the general case, where both x and y are additively
shared between two parties (P0 holds ⟨x⟩A0 , ⟨y⟩A0 and P1 holds
⟨x⟩A1 , ⟨y⟩A1 ), the multiplication can be computed as z = x × y =
(⟨x⟩A0 + ⟨x⟩A1 ) × (⟨y⟩A0 + ⟨y⟩A1 ). The two terms ⟨x⟩A0 × ⟨y⟩A0 and
⟨x⟩A1 × ⟨y⟩A1 can be computed locally by P0 and P1, respectively.
Two instances of the Du-Atallah protocol are needed to compute
shares of ⟨x⟩A0 × ⟨y⟩A1 and ⟨x⟩A1 × ⟨y⟩A0 . Please note that Pi should
not learn ⟨x⟩A1−i and ⟨y⟩A1−i , otherwise, secret values x and/or y are
revealed to Pi . At the end, P0 has
⟨x⟩A0 × ⟨y⟩A0 ,
〈⟨x⟩A0 × ⟨y⟩A1 〉A0 , 〈⟨x⟩A1 × ⟨y⟩A0 〉A0
and P1 has
⟨x⟩A1 × ⟨y⟩A1 ,
〈⟨x⟩A0 × ⟨y⟩A1 〉A1 , 〈⟨x⟩A1 × ⟨y⟩A0 〉A1
where ⟨z⟩A0 and ⟨z⟩A1 are the summation of each party’s shares,
respectively.
The Du-Atallah protocol is used in Sharemind [18] where there
are three active computing nodes that are involved in the online
phase, whereas, in Chameleon, the third party (STP) is only involved
in the offline phase. This problem can be solved since the role of
P2 can be shifted to the offline phase as follows: (i) Step one of
the Du-Attallah protocol can be computed in the offline phase for
as many multiplications as needed. (ii) In addition, P2 randomly
generates another l-bit number a2 and computes a3 = (a0×a1)−a2.
P2 sends a2 to P0 and a3 to P1 in the offline phase. During the
online phase, both parties additionally add their new shares (a2
and a3) to their shared results: ⟨z⟩A0,new = ⟨z⟩A0 + a2 and ⟨z⟩A1,new =
⟨z⟩A1 +a3. This modification is perfectly secure sinceP0 has received
a true random number and P1 has received a3 which is an additive
share of (a0 ×a1). Since a2 has uniform distribution, the probability
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Table 1: Summary of properties of the Du-Atallah multipli-
cation protocol and the protocol based on Multiplication
Triples in §2.4. (i, j) means P0 and P1 have to perform i and j
multiplications in plaintext, respectively. Offline and online
communications are expressed in number of bits. The size of
online communication corresponds to data transmission in
each direction. ∗Initial sharing of x is also considered.
Protocol # MULT ops Online Comm. Offline Comm. Rounds
Multiplication Triple (3,4) 2 · l 3 · l 2∗
Du-Atallah (1,2) l 2 · l 1
distribution of a3 is also uniform [18] and as a result, P1 cannot
infer additional information.
Optimizing the Du-Atallah Protocol. As we will discuss in
§5, in many cases, the computation model is such that one operand
x is held in cleartext by one party, e.g., P0, and the other operand
y is shared among two parties: P0 has ⟨y⟩A0 and P1 has ⟨y⟩A1 . This
situation repeatedly arises when the intermediate result is multi-
plied by one of the party’s inputs which is not shared. In this case,
only one instance of the Du-Atallah protocol is needed to compute
x × ⟨y⟩A1 . As analyzed in this section, employing this variant of the
Du-Atallah protocol is more efficient than the protocol based on
MTs. Please note that in order to utilize MTs, both operands need
to be shared among the two parties first, which, as we argue here,
is inefficient and unnecessary. Table 1 summarizes the computa-
tion and communication costs for the Du-Atallah protocol and the
protocol based on MTs (§2.4). As can be seen, online computation
and communication are improved by factor 2x. Also, the offline
communication is improved by factor 3x. Unfortunately, using the
Du-Atallah protocol in this format will reduce the efficiency of
vector dot product computation in Chameleon. Please note that
it is no longer possible to perform a complete dot product of two
vectors by two parties only since the third share (⟨z⟩A2 = a0 × a1)
is shared between two parties (P0 and P1). However, this problem
can be fixed by a modification which we describe next.
Du-Atallah Protocol and Vector Dot Product. We further
modify the optimized Du-Atallah protocol such that the complete
vector dot product is efficiently processed. The idea is that instead
of the STP additively sharing its shares, it first sums its shares
and then sends the additively shared versions to the two parties.
Consider vectors of size n. The STP needs to generate n different
a0 and a1 as a list for a single vector multiplication. We denote the
jth member of the list as [a0]j and [a1]j . Our modification requires
that the STP generates a single l-bit value a2 and sends it to P0.
The STP also computes
a3 =
n−1∑
i=0
[a0]j × [a1]j − a2
and sends it to P1. We call a2 and a3 the Vector Dot Product Shares
or VDPS. This requires that the STP knows the size of the array
in the offline phase. Since the functionality of the computation is
not secret, we can calculate the size and number of all dot products
in the offline phase and ask for the corresponding random shares
from the STP.
Reducing Communication. A straightforward implementa-
tion of the offline phase of the Du-Atallah protocol requires that
the STP sends ∼ n random numbers of size l ([a0]j and [a1]j ) to
P0 and P1 for a single dot product of vectors of size n. However,
we suggest reducing the communication using a Pseudo Random
Generator (PRG) for generating the random numbers as was pro-
posed in [36]. Instead of sending the complete list of numbers to
each party, the STP can create and send random PRG seeds for
each string to the parties such that each party can create [a0]j and
[a1]j locally using the PRG. For this purpose, we implement the
PRG using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), a low-cost block
cipher, in counter mode (AES CTR-DRBG). Our implementation
follows the description of the NIST Recommendation for DRBG
[8]. From a 256-bit seed, AES CTR-DRBG can generate 263 indistin-
guishable random bits. If more than 263 bits are needed, the STP
sends more seeds to the parties. The STP uses the same seeds in
order to generate a2 and a3 for each dot product. Therefore, the
communication is reduced from n × l bits to sending a one-time
256-bit seed and an l-bit number per single dot product.
Performance evaluation. For an empirical performance eval-
uation of our optimized VDP protocol, we refer the reader to §5.2:
the evaluated SVM classification mainly consists of a VDP com-
putation together with a negligible subtraction and comparison
operation.
4.3 Supporting Signed Fixed-point Numbers
Chameleon supports Signed Fixed-point Numbers (SFN) in addition
to integer operations. Supporting SFN requires that not only all
three secure computation protocols (GC, GMW, and Additive SS)
support SFN but the secret translation protocols should be compati-
ble as well. We note that the current version of the ABY framework
only supports unsigned integer values. We added an abstraction
layer to the ABY framework such that it supports signed fixed-
point numbers. The TinyGarble framework can support this type
if the corresponding Boolean circuit is created and fed into the
framework.
All additive secret sharing protocols only support unsigned inte-
ger values. However, in this section, we describe how such protocols
can be modified to support signed fixed-point numbers. Modification
for supporting signed integers can be done by representing numbers
in two’s complement format. Consider the ring Z2l which consists
of unsigned integer numbers {0, 1, 2, ..., 2l−1 − 1, 2l−1, ..., 2l − 1}.
We can perform signed operations only by interpreting these num-
bers differently as the two’s complement format: {0, 1, 2, ..., 2l−1 −
1,−2l−1, ...,−1}. By doing so, signed operations work seamlessly.
In order to support fixed-point precision, one solution is to inter-
pret signed integers as signed fixed-point numbers. Each number is
represented in two’s complement format with the Most Significant
Bit (MSB) being the sign bit. There are α and β bits for integer and
fraction parts, respectively. Therefore, the total number of bits is
equal to γ = α + β + 1. While this works perfectly for addition and
subtraction, it cannot be used for multiplication. The reason is that
when multiplying two numbers in a ring, the rightmost 2 × β bits
of the result now correspond to the fraction part instead of β bits.
Also, β bits from MSBs are overflown and discarded. Our solution
to this problem is to perform all operations in the ring Z2l where
l = γ + β and after each multiplication, we shift the result β bits to
the right while replicating the sign bit for β MSBs.
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In addition to the support by the computation engines, share
translation protocols also work correctly. Share translation from
GC to GMW works fine as it operates on bit-level and is transpar-
ent to the number representation format. Share translation from
GC/GMW to additive sharing either happens using a subtraction
circuit or OT. In the first case, the result is valid since the subtraction
of two signed fixed-point numbers in two’s complement format is
identical to subtracting two unsigned integers. In the second case,
OT is on bit-level and again transparent to the representation for-
mat. Finally, share translation from additive sharing to GC/GMW
is correct because it uses an addition circuit which is identical for
unsigned integers and signed fixed-point numbers.
Floating Point Operations. The current version of Chameleon
supports floating point operations by performing all computations
in the GC protocol. Since our GC engine is based on TinyGarble,
our performance result is identical to that of TinyGarble, hence, we
do not report the experimental results of floating-point operations.
A future direction of this work can be to break down the primitive
floating point operations, e.g., ADD, MULT, SUB, etc. into smaller
atomic operations based on integer values. Consequently, one can
perform the linear operations in the ring and non-linear opera-
tions in GC/GMW, providing a faster execution for floating-point
operations.
Most methods for secure computation on floating and fixed point
numbers proposed in the literature were realized in Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme, e.g. [2, 29, 58, 79, 91], but some of them also in GC
[79], GMW [35], and HE [67] based schemes. The quality of the
algorithms varies from self-made to properly implemented IEEE
754 algorithms, such as in [35, 79]. The corresponding software
implementations were done either in the frameworks Sharemind
[18] and PICCO [91], or as standalone applications. For fixed-point
arithmetics, Aliasgari et al. [2] proposed algorithms that outperform
even integer arithmetic for certain operations. As a future direction
of this work, we plan to integrate their methodology in Chameleon.
4.4 Generating Multiplication Triples
As we discussed in §2.4, each multiplication on additive secret
shares requires an Arithmetic Multiplication Triple (A-MT) and one
round of communication. Similarly, evaluating eachANDgate in the
GMWprotocol requires a BooleanMultiplication Triple (B-MT) [36].
In the offline phase, we calculate the number of MTs (NA-MT and
NB-MT). The STP precomputes all MTs needed and sends them
to both parties. More precisely, to generate A-MTs, the STP uses
a PRG to produce five l-bit random numbers corresponding to
a0,b0, c0,a1, and b1. We denote the jth triple with [.]j . Therefore,
the STP completes MTs by computing c1’s as [c1]j = ([a0]j+[a1]j )×
([b0]j + [b1]j ) − [c0]j . Finally, the STP sends [a0]j , [b0]j , and [c0]j
to the first party and [a1]j , [b1]j , and [c1]j to the second party for
j = 1, 2, ...,NA-MT. Computing B-MTs is also very similar with the
only differences that all numbers are 1-bit and [c1]j is calculated as
[c1]j = ([a0]j ⊕ [a1]j ) ∧ ([b0]j ⊕ [b1]j ) ⊕ [c0]j .
Reducing Communication. A basic implementation of pre-
computing A-MTs and B-MTs requires communication of 3 × l ×
NA-MT and 3 × NB-MT bits from the STP to each party, respectively.
However, similar to the idea of [36] presented in §4.2, we use a PRG
to generate random strings from seeds locally by each party. To
summarize the steps:
(1) STP generates two random seeds: seed0 for generating
[a0]j , [b0]j , and [c0]j and seed1 for [a1]j and [b1]j .
(2) STP computes [c1]j = ([a0]j + [a1]j ) × ([b0]j + [b1]j ) − [c0]j
for j = 1, 2, ...,NA−MT .
(3) STP sends seed0 to the first party and seed1 together with
the list of [c1]j to the second party.
After receiving the seeds, both parties locally generate their
share of the triples using the same PRG. This method reduces the
communication from 3 × l × NA-MT to 256 and 256 + l × NA-MT
bits for the first and second parties, respectively. The STP follows a
similar process with the same two seeds to generate B-MTs. Figure 1
illustrates the seed expansion idea to generate MTs [36].
STP
P1
P0
R
seed0
seed1
R
seed0
seed1
PRG
PRG
[c1]j
PRG
PRG
[a0]j , [b0]j , [c0]j
[a1]j , [b1]j [c1]j 
[a0]j , [b0]j , [c0]j
[a1]j , [b1]j
Figure 1: Seed expansion process to precompute A-MTs/B-
MTs with low communication.
4.5 Fast STP-aided Oblivious Transfer
Utilizing the idea of correlated randomness [50], we present an
efficient and fast protocol for Oblivious Transfer that is aided by the
Semi-honest Third Party (STP). Our protocol comprises an offline
phase (performed by the STP) and an online phase (performed by
the two parties). The protocol is described for one 1-out-of-2 OT.
The process repeats for as many OTs as required. In the offline
phase, the STP generates random masks q0, q1 and a random bit
r and sends q0, q1 to the sender and r , qr to the receiver. In the
online phase, the two parties execute the online phase of Beaver’s
OT precomputation protocol [12] described in Figure 2. Please
note that all OTs in Chameleon including OTs used in GC and
secret translation from GC/GMW to Additive are implemented as
described above.
Sender Receiver
Has: messages q0,q1 Has: message qr and r
Input: messagesm0,m1 Input: choice bit b
Output: - Output:mb
b′←− b ′ = r ⊕ b
(s0, s1) ={
(q0 ⊕m0,q1 ⊕m1) if b ′ = 0
(q0 ⊕m1,q1 ⊕m0) if b ′ = 1
(s0,s1)−→ mb = sr ⊕ qr
Figure 2: Beaver’s OT precomputation protocol [12].
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Reducing Communication. Similar to the idea discussed in
§4.4, the STP does not actually need to send the list of (q0,q1) to
the sender and r to the receiver. Instead, it generates two random
seeds and sends them to the two parties. The STP only needs to
send the full list of qr to the receiver.
4.6 Security Justification
The security proof of Chameleon is based on the following propo-
sitions: (i) the GC execution is secure since it is based on [87]. (ii)
The security proof of GMW execution and share type translation
directly follows the one of [37]. (iii) All operations in A-SS are per-
formed in the ring Z2l which is proven to be secure in [18]. Our
support for SFN only involves the utilization of a bigger ring and
does not change the security guarantees, and finally (iv) our opti-
mizations for reducing the communication between the STP and the
two parties are secure as we use a PRG instantiation recommended
by the NIST standard [8].
5 MACHINE LEARNING APPLICATIONS
Many applications can benefit from our framework. Here, we cover
only two important applications in greater detail due to the space
constraints. In particular, we show how Chameleon can be lever-
aged in Deep Learning (§5.1) and classification based on Support
Vector Machines (§5.2).
We run all our experiments for a long-term security parameter
(128-bit security) on machines equipped with Intel Core i7-4790
CPUs @ 3.6GHz and 16GB of RAM. The CPUs support fast AES
evaluations due to AES-NI. The STP is instantiated as a separate
compute node running a C/C++ implementation. The communica-
tion between the STP and its clients as well as between the clients
is protected by TLS with client authentication. Except when stated
otherwise, all parties run on different machines within the same
Gigabit network.
5.1 Deep Learning
We evaluate our framework on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) and
a more sophisticated variant, Convolutional Deep Neural Networks
(CNNs). Processing both, DNNs and CNNs, requires the support
for signed fixed-point numbers. We compare our results with the
state-of-the-art Microsoft CryptoNets [38], which is a customized
solution for this purpose based on homomorphic encryption, as
well as other recent solutions.
Deep Neural Networks. Deep learning is a very powerful
method for modeling and classifying raw data that has gained
a lot of attention in the past decade due to its superb accuracy.
Deep Learning automatically learns complex features using arti-
ficial neural networks. While there are many different DNNs and
CNNs, they all share a similar structure. They are networks of
multiple layers stacked on top of each other where the output of
each layer is the input to the next layer. The input to DNNs is a
feature vector, which we denote as x. The input is passed through
the intermediate layers (hidden layers). The output vector of the Lth
layer is x(L) where x (L)i denotes the i
th element. The length of the
vector can change after each layer. The length of the intermediate
result vector at layer L is NL = length(x(L)). A DNN is composed
of a series of (i) Fully Connected layer (FC): the output x(L) is the
matrix multiplication of input vector x(L−1) and a matrix weight
W, that is, x(L) = x(L−1) ·W(L). In general, the size of the input
and output of the FC layer is denoted as FCNL−1×NL . (ii) Activation
layer (Act): which applies an activation function f (.) on the input
vector: x (L)i = f (x
(L−1)
i ). The activation function is usually a Rec-
tified Linear Unit (ReLu), Tangent-hyperbolic (Tanh), or Sigmoid
function [38, 85].
The input to a CNN is a picture represented as a matrix X where
each element corresponds to the value of a pixel. Pictures can have
multiple color channels, e.g., RGB, in which case the picture is
represented as a multidimensional matrix, a.k.a, tensor. CNNs are
similar to DNNs but they can potentially have additional layers:
(i) Convolution layer (C) which is essentially a weighted sum of
a “square region” of size sq in the proceeding layer. To compute
the next output, the multiplication window on the input matrix is
moved by a specific number, called stride (st ). The weight matrix is
called kernel. There can be Nmap (called map count) kernels in the
convolution layer. (ii) Mean-pooling (MeP) which is the average of
each square region of the proceeding layer. (iii) Max-pooling (MaP)
is the maximum of each square region of the proceeding layer. The
details of all layers are provided in Table 2.
Many giant technology companies such as Google, Microsoft,
Facebook, and Apple have invested millions of dollars in accurately
training neural networks to serve in different services. Clients that
want to use these services currently need to reveal their inputs that
may contain sensitive information to the cloud servers. Therefore,
there is a special need to run a neural network (trained by the cloud
server) on input from another party (clients) while keeping both, the
network parameters and the input, private to the respective owners.
For this purpose, Microsoft has announced CryptoNets [38] that can
process encrypted queries in neural networks using homomorphic
encryption. Next, we compare the performance result of Chameleon
to CryptoNets and other more recent works.
Table 2: Different types of layers in DNNs and CNNs.
Layer Functionality
FC x (L)i =
∑NL−1−1
j=0 W
(L−1)
i j × x
(L−1)
j
Act x (L)i = f (xL−1i )
C x (L)i j =
∑sq−1
a=0
∑sq−1
b=0 W
(L−1)
ab × xL−1(i ·st+a)(j ·st+b)
MeP x (L)i j = Mean(xL−1(i+a)(j+b)), a,b ∈ {1, 2, ..., sq }
MaP x (L)i j = Max(xL−1(i+a)(j+b)), a,b ∈ {1, 2, ..., sq }
Comparison with Previous Works (MNIST Dataset). A
comparison of recent works is given in Table 3 and described next.
We use the MNIST dataset [62] (same as Microsoft CryptoNets)
containing 60,000 images of hand-written digits. Each image is
represented as 28 × 28 pixels with values between 0 and 255 in
gray scale. We also train the same NN architecture using the Keras
library [32] running on top of TensorFlow [1] using 50,000 images.
We achieve a similar test accuracy of ∼ 99% examined over 10,000
test images. The architecture of the trained CNN is depicted in Fig-
ure 3 and composed of (i) C layer with a kernel of size 5 × 5, stride
2, and map count of 5. (ii) Act layer with ReLu as the activation
function. (iii) A FC980×100 layer. (iv) Another ReLu Act layer, and
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Figure 3: Architecture of our Convolutional Neural Network trained for the MNIST dataset. The upper bar illustrates which
protocol is being executed at each phase of the CNN. The lower bar shows different layers of the CNN from the DL perspective.
Table 3: Comparison of secure deep learning frameworks, their characteristics, and performance results for classifying one
image from the MNIST dataset in the LAN setting.
Framework Methodology Non-linear Activationand Pooling Functions
Classification Timing (s) Communication (MB) Classification
AccuracyOffline Online Total Offline Online Total
Microsoft CryptoNets [38] Leveled HE ✗ - - 297.5 - - 372.2 98.95%
DeepSecure [81] GC ✓ - - 9.67 - - 791 99%
SecureML [71] Linearly HE, GC, SS ✗ 4.70 0.18 4.88 - - - 93.1%
MiniONN (Sqr Act.) [66] Additively HE, GC, SS ✗ 0.90 0.14 1.04 3.8 12 15.8 97.6%
MiniONN (ReLu + Pooling) [66] Additively HE, GC, SS ✓ 3.58 5.74 9.32 20.9 636.6 657.5 99%
EzPC [31] GC, Additive SS ✓ - - 5.1 - - 501 99%
Chameleon (This Work) GC, GMW, Additive SS ✓ 1.25 0.99 2.24 5.4 5.1 10.5 99%
(v) a FC100×10 layer. The lower bar in Figure 3 shows the different
layers of the CNN while the upper bar depicts the corresponding
protocol that executes each part of the CNN.
The output of the last layer is a vector of ten numbers where each
number represents the probability of the image being each digit (0-
9). We extract the maximum value and output it as the classification
result. The trained CNN is the server’s input and the client’s input
is the image that is going to be classified. More precisely, the trained
model consists of the kernels’ values and weights (matrices) of the
FC layers. The output of the secure computation is the classification
(inference) label.
The performance results compared with Microsoft CryptoNets
and most recent works are provided in Table 3. We report our run-
time as Offline/Online/Total. As can be seen, Chameleon is 133x
faster compared to the customized solution based on homomorphic
encryption of CryptoNets [38]. They performed the experiments
on a similar machine (Intel Xeon ES-1620 CPU @ 3.5GHz with
16GB of RAM). Please note that in CryptoNets [38], numbers are
represented with 5 to 10 bit precision while in Chameleon, all num-
bers are represented as 64 bit numbers. While the precision does
not considerably change the accuracy for the MNIST dataset, it
might significantly reduce the accuracy results for other datasets.
In addition, the CryptoNets framework neither supports non-linear
activation nor pooling functions. However, it is worth-mentioning
that CryptoNets can process a batch of images of size 8,192 with no
additional costs. Therefore, the CryptoNets framework can process
up to 51,739 predictions per hour. Nonetheless, it is necessary that
the system batches a large number of images and processes them
together. This, in turn, might reduce the throughput of the network
significantly. A recent solution based on leveled homomorphic
encryption is called CryptoDL [48]. In CryptoDL, several activa-
tion functions are approximated using low-degree polynomials and
mean-pooling is used as a replacement for max-pooling. The au-
thors state up to 163,840 predictions per hour for the same batch
size as in CryptoNets. For a single instance, CryptoDL incurs the
same computation and communication costs as for one batch. Also,
note that in Chameleon one can implement and evaluate virtually
any activation and pooling function.
The DeepSecure framework [81] is a GC-based framework for se-
cure Deep Learning inference. DeepSecure also proposes data-level
and network-level preprocessing step before the secure compu-
tation protocol. They report a classification run-time of 9.67 s to
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Table 4: Classification time (in seconds) and communication
costs (in megabytes) of Chameleon for different batch sizes
of the MNIST dataset in the WAN setting (100Mbit/s band-
width, 100ms round-trip time).
Classification Time (s) Communication (MB)
Batch Size Offline Online Total Offline Online Total
1 4.03 2.85 6.88 7.8 5.1 12.9
10 10.00 10.65 20.65 78.4 50.5 128.9
100 69.38 84.09 153.47 784.1 505.3 1289.4
classify images from the MNIST dataset using a CNN similar to
CryptoNets. They utilize non-linear activation and pooling func-
tions. Chameleon is 4.3x faster and requires 75x less communication
compared to DeepSecure when running an identical CNN.
SecureML [71] is a framework for privacy-preserving machine
learning. Similar to CryptoNets, SecureML focuses on linear activa-
tion functions. The MiniONN [66] framework reduces the classifica-
tion latency on an identical network from 4.88 s to 1.04 s using sim-
ilar linear activation functions. MiniONN also supports non-linear
activation functions and max-pooling. They report a classification
latency of 9.32 s while successfully classifying MNIST images with
99% accuracy. For a similar accuracy and network, Chameleon has
4.2x lower latency and requires 63x less communication.
For the evaluation of the very recent EzPC framework [31], the
authors implement the CNN from MiniONN in a high-level lan-
guage. The EzPC compiler translates this implementation to stan-
dard ABY input while automatically inserting conversions between
GC and A-SS. This results in a total run-time of 5.1 s for classify-
ing one image. However, note that Chameleon requires 48x less
communication.
Table 3 shows that the total run-time of the end-to-end execution
of Chameleon for a single image is only 2.24 s. However, Chameleon
can easily be scaled up to classify multiple images at the same time
using a CNN with non-linear activation and pooling functions. For
a batch size of 100, our framework requires only 0.18 s processing
time and 10.5MB communication per image providing up to 20,000
predictions per hour in the LAN setting. Table 4 furthermore shows
the required run-times and communication for different batch sizes
in a WAN setting where we restrict the bandwidth to 100Mbit/s
with a round-trip time of 100ms. In the WAN setting, we replace
all GMW protocol invocations with the GC protocol to benefit from
its constant round property.
Comparison with Previous Works (CIFAR-10 Dataset). In
accordance with previous works, we also evaluate our framework
by running a CNN for classifying images from the CIFAR-10 dataset
[59]. The CIFAR-10 dataset comprises 60,000 color images with a
resolution of 32 x 32 pixels. We implement and train a CNN with
the same architecture as given in Fig. 13 in [66], which achieves
81.61 % accuracy. Compared to the CNN used for classifying MNIST
images, the architecture of this CNN is more sophisticated: in total
there are 7 convolution layers, 7 ReLu activation layers, 2 mean-
pooling layers, and one fully connected layer. In Figure 4 we give
the architecture of the CNN implemented and trained for classifying
images from the CIFAR-10 dataset. The architecture is the same as
the one in Fig. 13 in [66]. We also list the protocols used to execute
each layer of the CNN in Chameleon and the necessary protocol
Table 5: Classification time (in seconds) and communication
costs (in gigabytes) of secure deep learning frameworks for
one image from the CIFAR-10 dataset in the LAN setting.
Framework Classification Time (s) Communication (GB)Offline Online Total Offline Online Total
MiniONN [66] 472 72 544 6.23 3.05 9.28
EzPC [31] - - 265.6 - - 40.63
Chameleon (This Work) 22.97 29.7 52.67 1.21 1.44 2.65
conversions. We report the performance results when classifying
one image in Table 5. Compared to MiniONN [66], the total run-
time is reduced by factor 10.3x. The more recent EzPC framework
[31] is still by factor 5x slower than our solution and requires 15x
more communication.
Layer Description Protocol
Convolution
Input image 3 × 32 × 32, window size 3 × 3, stride (1, 1),
pad (1, 1), number of output channels 64:
R64×1024 ← R64×27 · R27×1024.
A-SS
A2GMW
ReLu Activation Computes ReLu for each input. GMW
GMW2A
Convolution Window size 3 × 3, stride (1, 1), pad (1, 1), number ofoutput channels 64: R64×1024 ← R64×576 · R576×1024. A-SS
A2GMW
ReLu Activation Computes ReLu for each input. GMW
GMW2A
Mean Pooling Window size 1 × 2 × 2, outputs R64×16×16. A-SS
Convolution Window size 3 × 3, stride (1, 1), pad (1, 1), number ofoutput channels 64: R64×256 ← R64×576 · R576×256. A-SS
A2GMW
ReLu Activation Computes ReLu for each input. GMW
GMW2A
Convolution Window size 3 × 3, stride (1, 1), pad (1, 1), number ofoutput channels 64: R64×256 ← R64×576 · R576×256. A-SS
A2GMW
ReLu Activation Computes ReLu for each input. GMW
GMW2A
Mean Pooling Window size 1 × 2 × 2, outputs R64×16×16. A-SS
Convolution Window size 3 × 3, stride (1, 1), pad (1, 1), number ofoutput channels 64: R64×64 ← R64×576 · R576×64. A-SS
A2GMW
ReLu Activation Computes ReLu for each input. GMW
GMW2A
Convolution Window size 1 × 1, stride (1, 1), number of outputchannels 64: R64×64 ← R64×64 · R64×64. A-SS
A2GMW
ReLu Activation Computes ReLu for each input. GMW
GMW2A
Convolution Window size 1 × 1, stride (1, 1), number of outputchannels 16: R16×64 ← R16×64 · R64×64. A-SS
A2GMW
ReLu Activation Computes ReLu for each input. GMW
GMW2A
Fully Connected Layer Fully connects the incoming 1024 nodes to theoutgoing 10 nodes: R10×1 ← R10×1024 · R1024×1. A-SS
A2GC
Arg Max Extracts the label of the class with the highestprobability. GC
Figure 4: The architecture of the CNN trained from the
CIFAR-10 dataset (taken from [66]) and the protocols used
to execute each layer in Chameleon, including the necessary
protocol conversions.
Further RelatedWorks. One of the earliest solutions for obliv-
iously evaluating a neural network was proposed by Orlandi et
al. [75]. They suggest adding fake neurons to the hidden layers in
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the original network and evaluating the network using HE. Cha-
banne et al. [30] also approximate the ReLu non-linear activation
function using low-degree polynomials and provide a normaliza-
tion layer prior to the activation layer. However, they do not report
experimental results. Sadeghi and Schneider proposed to utilize
universal circuits to securely evaluate neural networks and fully
hide their structure [83]. Privacy-preserving classification of elec-
trocardiogram (ECG) signals using neural networks has been ad-
dressed in [10]. The recent work of Shokri and Shmatikov [85]
is a Differential Privacy (DP) based approach for the distributed
training of a Neural Network and they do not provide secure DNN
or CNN inference. Due to the added noise in DP, any attempt to
implement secure inference suffers from a significant reduction in
accuracy of the prediction. Phong et al. [61] propose a mechanism
for privacy-preserving deep learning based on additively homo-
morphic encryption. They do not consider secure deep learning
inference (classification). There are also limitations of deep learn-
ing when an adversary can craft malicious inputs in the training
phase [77]. Moreover, deep learning can be used to break semantic
image CAPTCHAs [86].
5.2 Support Vector Machines (SVMs)
One of the most frequently used classification tools in machine
learning and data mining is the Support Vector Machine (SVM).
An SVM is a supervised learning method in which the model is
created based on labeled training data. The result of the training
phase is a non-probabilistic binary classifier. The model can then
be used to classify input data x which is a d-dimensional vector. In
Chameleon, we are interested in a scenario where the server holds
an already trained SVM model and the user holds the query x. Our
goal is to classify the user’s query without disclosing the user’s
input to the server or the server’s model to the user.
The training data, composed of N d-dimensional vectors, can be
viewed as N points in a d-dimensional space. Each point i is labeled
as either yi ∈ {−1, 1}, indicating which class the data point belongs
to. If the two classes are linearly separable, a (d − 1)-dimensional
hyperplane that separates these two classes can be used to clas-
sify future queries. A new query point can be labeled based on
which side of the hyperplane it resides on. The hyperplane is called
decision boundary. While there can be infinitely many such hyper-
planes, a hyperplane is chosen that maximizes the margin between
the two classes. That is, a hyperplane is chosen such that the dis-
tance between the nearest point of each class to the hyperplane
is maximized. Those training points that reside on the margin are
called support vectors. This hyperplane is chosen to achieve the
highest classification accuracy. Figure 5 illustrates an example for a
two-dimensional space. The optimal hyperplane can be represented
using a vector w and a distance from the origin b. Therefore, the
optimization task can be formulated as:
minimize ∥w∥ s.t. yi(w · xi − b) ⩾ 1, i = 1, 2, ...,N
The size of the margin equals M = 2∥w∥ . This approach is called
hard-margin SVM.
An extension of the hard-margin SVM, called a soft-margin SVM,
is used for scenarios where the two classes are not linearly separable.
In this case, the hinge lost function is used to penalize if the training
sample is residing on the wrong side of the classification boundary.
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Figure 5: Classification using Support Vector Machine
(SVM).
Table 6: Classification time (in seconds) and communication
costs (in kilobytes) of Chameleon using SVMmodels for dif-
ferent feature sizes in the LAN setting.
Classification Time (ms) Communication (kB)
Feature Size Offline Online Total Offline Online Total
10 8.91 0.97 9.88 3.2 3.3 6.5
100 9.49 0.99 10.48 3.9 4.7 8.7
1000 10.28 1.14 11.42 11.1 19.1 30.3
As a result, the optimization task is modified to:
1
N
N∑
i=1
max (0, 1 − yi(w · xi − b)) + λ∥w∥2
where λ is a parameter for the tradeoff between the size of the
margin and the number of points that lie on the correct side of the
boundary.
For both soft-margin and hard-margin SVMs, the performed
classification task is similar. The output label of the user’s query is
computed as:
label ∈ {−1, 1} = sign(w · x − b)
We run our experiments using the same setup described in §5.
The results of the experiments are provided in Table 6 for feature
vector sizes of 10, 100, and 1,000.
Comparison with Previous Works. Makri et al. [68] present
PICS, a private image classification system based on SVM learn-
ing. They evaluate their implementation in SPDZ [34] with two
computation nodes. For one binary classification with 20 features,
they report 145 s/30ms offline/online run-time. Although in a dif-
ferent security and computational model, Chameleon performs the
same task four orders of magnitude faster. Bos et al. [19] study
privacy-preserving classification based on hyperplane decision,
Naive Bayes, and decision trees using homomorphic encryption.
For a credit approval dataset with 47 features, they report a run-time
of 217ms and 40 kB of communication, whereas, Chameleon can
securely classify a query with 1,000 features in only 11.42ms with
30.3 kB of communication. Rahulamathavan et al. [80] also design
a solution based on homomorphic encryption for binary as well
as multi-class classification based on SVMs. In the case of binary
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Table 7: Run-Times (in milliseconds unless stated otherwise) for different atomic operations and comparison with prior
art. Each experiment is performed for 1,000 operations on 32-bit numbers in parallel. The detailed performance results for
ABY [37] are provided for three different modes of operation: GC, GMW, and Additive. Minimum values marked in bold.
TinyGarble [87] ABY-GC [37] ABY-GMW [37] ABY-A [37] Sharemind [18] Chameleon
Op Online Offline Online Offline Online Offline Online Online Offline Online
ADD 1.57 s 11.71 2.73 25.78 4.73 0.00 0.00 1 µs 0.00 0.00
MULT 2.31 s 423.82 112.29 174.52 14.25 10.46 0.59 17 4.24 0.13
XOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 µs 0.00 0.00
AND 1.58 s 11.83 2.34 9.27 0.52 17 1.50 0.56
CMP 1.57 s 11.90 2.63 17.39 1.63 2.5 s 2.46 1.48
EQ 1.56 s 11.60 2.42 9.11 1.15 5 s 1.54 1.09
MUX 1.59 s 11.91 2.49 1.06 0.68 34 1.52 0.63
Table 8: Communication (in kilobytes unless stated otherwise) for different atomic operations and comparison with prior art.
Each experiment is performed for 1,000 operations on 32-bit numbers in parallel. The detailed performance results of the ABY
framework [37] is provided for three modes of operation: GC, GMW, and Additive. Minimum values marked in bold.
TinyGarble [87] ABY-GC [37] ABY-GMW [37] ABY-A [37] Sharemind [18] Chameleon
Op Total Offline Online Offline Online Offline Online Total Offline Online
ADD 7936 992 0 3593 76 0 0 0 0 0
MULT 318 K 47649 0 37900 840 1280 16 192 8 16
XOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AND 8192 1024 0 1028 16 192 12 8
CMP 8192 1024 0 2851 45 23 33
EQ 7936 992 0 995 16 8 12
MUX 8192 1024 0 33 8 384 8 4
classification, for a dataset with 9 features, they report 7.71 s execu-
tion time and 1.4MB communication. In contrast, for the same task,
Chameleon requires less than 10ms execution time and 6.5 kB of
communication. Laur et al. [60] provide privacy-preserving train-
ing algorithms based on general kernel methods. They also study
privacy-preserving classification based on SVMs but they do not
report any benchmark results. Vaidya et al. [88] propose a method
to train an SVMmodel where the training data is distributed among
multiple parties. This scenario is different than ours where we are
interested in the SVM-based classification. As a proof-of-concept,
we have focused on SVM models for linear decision boundaries.
However, Chameleon can be used for non-linear decision bound-
aries as well.
6 BENCHMARKS OF ATOMIC OPERATIONS
We benchmark different atomic operations of Chameleon and
compare them with three prior art frameworks: TinyGarble [87],
ABY [37], and Sharemind [18]. The result for ABY is reported for
three different scenarios: GC-only, GMW-only, and Additive SS-
only. For TinyGarble, ABY, and Chameleon we run the frameworks
ourselves. The benchmarking environment remains the same as
described in §5. Unlike TinyGarble and ABY, Sharemind lacks built-
in atomic benchmarks and is a commercial product that requires
contracting even for academic purposes. Thus, we give the results
from the original paper [18] and justify why Chameleon performs
better on equal hardware.
We do not include WAN benchmarks of atomic operations for
the following reason: Due to higher latency, GC-based circuit evalu-
ation with constant rounds is preferred instead of GMW for binary
operations. However, since the atomic benchmarks do not measure
input sharing (for which GC uses STP-aided OT generation), no
difference is visible to prior art.
Evaluation Results. The detailed run-times and communica-
tion costs for arithmetic and binary operations are given in Table 7
and in Table 8, respectively. The highlighted area for ABY-A in
both tables reflects that ABY does not perform these operations in
additive secret sharing. The highlighted area in Table 8 for Share-
mind indicates that the corresponding information is not reported
in the original paper. Table 9 additionally shows the run-times for
conversions between different sharings.4 All reported run-times
are the average of 10 executions with less than 15% variance.
Table 9: Run-Times (in milliseconds) for conversion opera-
tions and comparisonwith prior art. Each experiment is per-
formed for 1,000 operations on 32-bit numbers in parallel.
Minimum values marked in bold.
ABY [37] Chameleon
Op Offline Online Offline Online
GC2GMW 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GMW2A 9.47 2.44 3.45 2.33
GMW2GC 17.05 1.30 13.24 1.15
A2GC 19.75 14.03 15.83 12.91
As can be seen, Chameleon outperforms all state-of-the-art
frameworks. Run-times and communication for arithmetic op-
erations in Chameleon are only given in A-SS since from the ABY
results and Table 9 it follows that even for a single addition or
multiplication operation it is worthwhile to perform a protocol con-
version. The remaining atomic operations for Chameleon are given
4The required communication for conversion operations equals ABY [37] since
STP-aided OT generation does not reduce the amount of communication (cf. Table 10).
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in Boolean sharing where we observe major improvements over
ABY due to our efficient B-MT precomputation.5 Regarding conver-
sion operations, the GMW2A, GMW2GC, and A2GC performance
in Chameleon benefits from fast STP-aided OTs (cf. §4.5).
Although, the experimental setup of Sharemind is computation-
ally weaker than ours, we emphasize that Chameleon is more effi-
cient because of the following reasons: (i) To compute each MULT
operation, Sharemind requires 6 instances of the Du-Atallah proto-
col while our framework needs only 2. (ii) In Sharemind, bit-level
operations such as XOR/AND require a bit-extraction protocol
which is computationally expensive. Please note that these costs
are not reported by [18] and hence are not reflected in Table 7.
(iii) Operations such as CMP, EQ, and MUX can most efficiently
be realized using GC/GMW protocols and as a result, Chameleon
can perform these operations faster. The run-times for TinyGarble
include base OTs, online OTs, garbling/evaluating, and data trans-
mission. This is why the run-time for MULT is not significantly
higher than for other operations that require orders of magnitude
fewer gates. However, in Chameleon, we precompute all OTs which
significantly reduces the run-time. Note that the shown run-times
and communication results for Chameleon represent the worst case,
namely for the party that receives additional data from the STP
besides the required seeds for OT and MT generation.6
Communication in the Offline Phase. The communication
costs of the offline phase in Chameleon are compared to ABY [37]
in Table 10. To generate a single B-MT, Chameleon requires only
a constant-size data transmission to one party and 256× less com-
munication to the other party compared to ABY. When generating
a single A-MT, the required communication to the other party is
reduced by factor 273×/289×/321× for a bitlength of 16/32/64, re-
spectively. This is a significant enhancement since in most machine
learning applications, the main bottleneck is the vector/matrix mul-
tiplication, which requires a large amount of A-MTs.
Table 10: Communication (in bits) in the offline phase in
Chameleon compared to prior art ABY [37].
ABY [37] Chameleon Improvement
OT 128 128 -
B-MT 256 1 256×
A-MT (bitlength ℓ = 16) 4,368 16 273×
A-MT (bitlength ℓ = 32) 9,248 32 289×
A-MT (bitlength ℓ = 64) 20,544 64 321×
7 RELATEDWORK
Chameleon is essentially a two-party framework that uses a Semi-
honest Third Party (STP) to generate correlated randomness in the
offline phase. In the following, we review the use of third parties in
secure computation as well as other secure two-party and multi-
party computation frameworks.
Third Party-based Secure Computation. Regarding the in-
volvement of a third party in secure two-party computation, there
5The benchmarking methodology inherited from ABY omits input sharing, which
is why no improvement for GC-based operations is measurable compared to ABY.
6An improved implementation could equally distribute computation and commu-
nication among the two parties by dividing the data sent by the STP evenly, thereby
further reducing the run-times.
have been several works that consider an outsourcing or server-
aided scenario, where the resources of one ormore untrusted servers
are employed to achieve sub-linear work in the circuit size of a func-
tion, evenworkload distribution, and output fairness. Realizing such
a scenario can be done by either employing fully-homomorphic
encryption (e.g., [5]) or extending Yao’s garbled circuit protocol
(e.g., [53]). Another important motivation for server-aided SFE is
to address the issue of low-powered mobile devices, as done in
[25–28, 36, 70]. Furthermore, server-aided secure computation can
be used to achieve stronger security against active adversaries [47].
The secure computation framework of [50, Chapter 6] also uti-
lizes correlated randomness. Beyond passive security and one STP,
this framework also covers active security and multiple STPs.
GC-based Frameworks. The first implementation of the GC
protocol is Fairplay [69] that allows users to write the program in
a high-level language called Secure Function Definition Language
(SFDL) which is translated into a Boolean circuit. FariplayMP [15]
is the extension of Fairplay to the multiparty setting. FastGC [51]
reduces the running time and memory requirements of the GC
execution by using pipelining. TinyGarble [87] is one of the recent
GC frameworks that proposes to generate compact and efficient
Boolean circuits using industrial logic synthesis tools. TinyGarble
also supports sequential circuits (cyclic graph representation of
circuits) in addition to traditional combinational circuits (acyclic
graph representation). Our GC engine implementation is based on
TinyGarble. ObliVM [65] provides a domain-specific programming
language and secure computation framework that facilitates the
development process. Frigate [72] is a validated compiler and cir-
cuit interpreter for secure computation. Also, the authors of [72]
test and validate several secure computation compilers and report
the corresponding limitations. PCF (Portable Circuit Format) [56]
has introduced a compact representation of Boolean circuits that
enables better scaling of secure computation programs. Authors
in [57] have shown the evaluation of a circuit with billion gates in
the malicious model by parallelizing operations.
Secret Sharing-based Frameworks. The Sharemind frame-
work [18] is based on additive secret sharing over the ring Z232 .
The computation is performed with three nodes and is secure in the
honest-but-curious adversary model where only one node can be
corrupted. SEPIA [21] is a library for privacy-preserving aggrega-
tion of data for network security and monitoring. SEPIA is based on
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme where computation is performed
by three (or more) privacy peers. VIFF (Virtual Ideal Functionality
Framework) [33] is a framework that implements asynchronous
secure computation protocols and is also based on Shamir’s secret
sharing. PICCO [91] is a source-to-source compiler that generates
secure multiparty computation protocols from functions written
in the C language. The output of the compiler is a C program that
runs the secure computation using linear secret sharing. SPDZ [34]
is a secure computation protocol based on additive secret sharing
that is secure against n − 1 corrupted computation nodes in the
malicious model. Recent work of [3, 4, 43] introduces an efficient
protocol for three-party secure computation. In general, for se-
cret sharing-based frameworks, three (or more) computation nodes
need to communicate in the online phase and in some cases, the
communication is quadratic in the number of computation nodes.
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However, in Chameleon, the third node (STP) is not involved in the
online phase which reduces the communication and running time.
While Chameleon offers more flexibility compared to secret-
sharing based frameworks, it is computationally more efficient
compared to Sharemind and SEPIA. To perform each multiplica-
tion, Sharemind needs 6 instances of the Du-Atallah protocol [18]
while Chameleon needs 1 (when one operand is shared) or 2 (in
the general case where both operands are shared). In SEPIA [21],
all operations are performed modulo a prime number which is
less efficient compared to modulo 2l and also requires multiple
multiplications for creating/reconstructing a share.
Mixed Protocol Frameworks. TASTY [46] is a compiler that
can generate mixed protocols based on GC and homomorphic en-
cryption. Several applications have been built that use mixed pro-
tocols, e.g., privacy-preserving ridge-regression [74], matrix factor-
ization [74], iris and finger-code authentication [17], and medical
diagnostics [9]. Recently, a new framework for compiling two-party
protocols called EzPC [31] was presented. EzPC uses ABY as its
cryptographic back-end: a simple and easy-to-use imperative pro-
gramming language is compiled to ABY input. An interesting fea-
ture of EzPC is its “cost awareness”, i.e. its ability to automatically
insert type conversion operations in order to minimize the total
cost of the resulting protocol. However, they claim that ABY’s GC
engine always provides better performance for binary operations
than GMW and thus convert only between A-SS and GC.
Our framework extends the ABY framework [37]. Specifically,
we add support for signed fixed-point numbers which is essential
for almost all machine learning applications such as processing deep
neural networks. In addition to combinational circuits, Chameleon
also supports sequential circuits by incorporating TinyGarble-
methodology [87] which provides more scalability. Our framework
provides a faster online phase and a more efficient offline phase in
terms of computation and communication due to the usage of an
STP. Moreover, we implement a highly efficient vector dot product
protocol based on correlated randomness generated by an STP.
Automatic Protocol Selection. The authors of [54] propose
two methods, one heuristic and one based on integer programming,
to find an optimal combination of two secure computation protocols,
HE and GC. This methodology has been applied to the ABY frame-
work in CheapSMC [78]. The current version of Chameleon does
not provide automatic protocol selection. However, the methods of
[31, 54, 78] can be applied in future work in order to automatically
partition Chameleon programs.
8 CONCLUSION
We introduced Chameleon, a novel hybrid (mixed-protocol) secure
computation framework based on ABY [37] that achieves unprece-
dented performance by (i) integrating sequential garbled circuits,
(ii) providing an optimized vector dot product protocol for fast ma-
trix multiplications, and (iii) employing a semi-honest third party in
the offline phase for generating correlated randomness that is used
for pre-computing OTs and multiplication triples. In contrast to
previous state-of-the-art frameworks, Chameleon supports signed
fixed-point numbers.We evaluated our framework on convolutional
neural networks where it can process an image of hand-written
digits 133x faster than the prior art Microsoft CryptoNets [38] and
4.2x faster than the most recent MiniONN [66].
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